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ESSAY
DISPELLING SUSPICIONS AS TO THE EXISTENCE
OF THE SELF-EVALUATIVE PRIVILEGE*
Hon. Arlene R. Lindsay' & Lisa C. Solbakken'
INTRODUCTION

The "self-evaluative privilege," or the "privilege of selfcritical analysis" as it has also been called,' has led a badgered existence in this circuit. Indeed, even those courts that
ultimately embrace the privilege's application tend to riddle
their analyses with disclaimers with respect to its viability.2
To this end, it has been duly observed that courts in this circuit "continue to grapple with whether and under what circumstances to recognize" the self-evaluative privilege.3
One component of the analytical disarray surrounding the
privilege is the result of the belief held by some that the Su-

'©1999 Arlene R. Lindsay and Lisa C. Solbakken. All Rights Reserved.
t United States Magistrate Judge, Eastern District of New York.
Brooklyn Law School, Class of 1998.
1 The self-evaluative privilege will be referred to throughout this Essay as the
"privilege."
2 See, e.g., Hardy v. New York News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 640-41 (S.D.N.Y.
1987) (applying the privilege to certain communications only after noting that
"several courts have raised serious questions about [its viability]"). This point is
aptly summarized by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: "A number
of courts have relied upon a self-evaluative privilege in diverse factual settings ....

More recently, however, courts have appeared reluctant to enforce even

a qualified 'self-evaluative' privilege. They typically concede its possible application
in some situations, but then proceed to find a reason why the documents in question do not fall within its scope." Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d
207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citations omitted); see also James F. Flanagan, Rejecting
a General Privilege for Self-Critical Analyses, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 551, 561
(1983) ("[S]elf critical or self-evaluative studies have never been adequately defined
by the courts.").
' See Michael C. Silberberg, Predatory Intent in Denying Access to Attorney,
N.Y. L.J., Oct. 15, 1999, at 6.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: 2

preme Court has already addressed, and rejected, the
privilege's theoretical foundation. To establish whether this
interpretation of Supreme Court "privilege precedent" is accurate, this Essay first reviews the decisions that provide the
basis for this position. It then considers the nature and extent
of the instruction that the Court's determinations provide with
respect to the viability of the self-evaluative privilege. Upon
completion of this examination, this Essay concludes that to so
rely on "privilege precedent" to preclude recognition of the
privilege is error, and that contrary to the opinions of several
lower courts, the privilege remains a viable mechanism by
which self-critical documents may be protected from disclosure.
It should be noted that this Essay does not undertake to
comment upon the definition of the self-evaluative privilege,
which has been discussed at length elsewhere.4 Nor does it
provide any significant discussion of the permutations of fact
that give rise to the privilege's application. Instead, this Essay
endeavors to dispel some of the suspicion typically held by
lower courts upon consideration of the privilege by rejecting
the aforementioned contention that Supreme Court precedent
precludes recognition of the privilege. The intention is to remove this unnecessary analytical hurdle with respect to the
privilege's application, with the hope that doing so will assist
district and magistrate courts confronted with the question of
the privilege's existence.

" See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Cynthia M. Hazelwood, Preserving the Confidentiality of Internal Corporate Investigations, 12 J. CORP. L. 335 (1987); Robert J.
Bush, Stimulating Corporate Self Regulation-The Corporate Self-Evaluative Privilege: ParadigmaticPreferentialism or Pragmatic Panacea, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 597
(1993); Marla Clark, The Privilege For Self-Critical Analysis, 42-JAN RES GESTAE 7,
9-14 (1999); Ellen Deason, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Discovery of
Affirmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L. REV. 405, 407-11 (1984);
Flanagan, supra note 2, at 551-54; Michael J. Holland, The Self-Analysis Privilege:
Obscuring the Truth but Safeguarding Improvement?, 25-FALL BRIEF 52, 52 (1995);
David P. Leonard, Codifying a Privilege for Self-Critical Analysis, 25 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 113, 11341 (1988); Stephen C. Simpson, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege
in Employment Law, 21 J. CORP. L. 577 (1996); Note, The Privilege of Self-Critical
Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1083-1100 (1983) [hereinafter Privilege of Self.
Critical Analysis].
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I. BACKGROUND
The self-evaluative privilege has its foundation in public
policy concerns that "certain types of information, vital to the
internal operations and improvement of certain industries,
ought to be protected from disclosure,"5 so not to "impede the
open and candid discussion of ideas."' In so doing, the privilege is said to preserve the free flow of information and dialogue generated pursuant to critical self-analyses undertaken
to redress errors or inequities that exist within a given operation or organization.7 The privilege has been asserted, with
varying degrees of success, to prevent disclosure of internal
investigatory reports,' equal employment opportunity stud-

Pkfinans Intl Corp. v. IBJ Schroder Leasing Corp., No. 93-5375, 1996 WL
675772, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1996).
' See Holland, supra note 4, at 52.
See, e.g., Peter A. Gish, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Environmental Audit Reports, 25 ENVTL. L. 73, 80-82 (1995).
' See In re Health Management, Inc., No. 96-0889 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 1999)
(unpublished) (applied); Abbott v. Harris Publications, No. 97-7648, 1999 WL
549002 (S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1999) (recognized, not applied); UBS Asset Mgmt. v.
Wood Gundy Corp., No 95-5157, 1999 WL 294843 (S.D.N.Y. May 11, 1999) (applied); Pkfmans Int'l Corp. v. IBJ Schroder Leasing Corp., No. 93-5375, 1996 WL
675772 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1996) (recognized, not applied); Chemical Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 1994 WL 89292 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 1994) (recognized, not applied); In re Salomon Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 91-5442, 1992 WL 350762 (S.D.N.Y. Nov.
13, 1992) (recognized, not applied); In re Crazy Eddie Litig., 792 F. Supp. 197
(E.D.N.Y. 1992) (applied); Lizotte v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., No.
85-7548, 1989 WL 260217 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 1989) (recognized, not applied); Ross
v. Bolton, 106 F.R.D. 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applied); Westmoreland v. CBS, 97
F.R.D. 703 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (recognized, not applied); New York Stock Exchange v.
Sloan, 22 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 500 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (applied).
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ies,9 hospital committee reports," and accident investigatory
reports within the context of personal injury suits.'
In order for the privilege to apply:
the information must [first] result from a critical self-analysis undertaken by the party seeking protection; second, the public must
have a strong interest in preserving the free flow of the type of information sought; [and] finally, the information must be of the type
whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed."

Refinements of the privilege have included the requirements
that documents were prepared confidentially and that they
were, in fact, kept confidential.' Finally, "the self-critical
analysis privilege is not absolute; it protects only the self-

' See Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc., No. 98-2205, 1999 WL 511673 (S.D.N.Y.
July 20, 1999) (applied); Troupin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 546
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applied); Sheppard v. Consolidated Edison Co., 893 F. Supp. 6
(E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applied); Reilly v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., No. 93-7317, 1995
WL 105286 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1995) (recognized, not applied); Abel v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., No. 91-6261, 1993 WL 33348 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993) (does not recognize); Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91-0035, 1993 WL 362380 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 16, 1993) (applied); Cobb v. Rockefeller Univ., No. 90-6516, 1991 WL 222125
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1991) (applied); Hardy v. New York News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognized, not applied); Boyd v. City of New York, No. 86-4501CSH, 1987 WL 6915 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1987) (not applied); Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., No. 83 Civ. 3716, 1984 WL 55541 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
1984) (applied); Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (recognized,
not applied).
" See Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (applied).
See Spencer v. Sea-Land Serv. Inc., No 98-2817, 1999 WL 619637 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 16, 1999) (recognized, not applied); Wimer v. Sealand Serv., Inc., No. 968730, 1997 WL 375661 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1997) (recognized, not applied).
12 Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis, supra note 4, at 1086. The aforementioned
article is the alpha point for many of the analyses conducted by district courts
when considering the privilege. See, e.g., Spencer, 1999 WL 619637, at *2; Wimer,
1997 WL 375661, at *1; Chemical Bank, 1994 WL 89292, at *1; In re Salomon
Inc., 1992 WL 350762, at *1; Hardy, 114 F.R.D. at 640. However, the privilege's
genesis may be traced back to Bredice v. Doctors Hospital, Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249
(D.D.C. 1970), affd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Bredice, the district court
found that a plaintiff in a malpractice suit was not entitled to the minutes or
reports generated during medical staff meetings. See id. at 251. The court found
that the documents were entitled to a qualified privilege, as the "purpose of these
staff meetings is the improvement, through self analysis, of the efficiency of medical procedures and techniques" and because "[tihere is an overwhelming public
interest in having those [meetings] on a confidential basis so that the flow of
ideas and advice can continue unimpeded." Id. at 250-51.
"sSee Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th Cr.
1992).
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evaluative material, not the underlying facts which form the
foundation of the evaluation or analysis."'4
Since its birth in 1970,'" the privilege has been faced
with a legal environment generally hostile to the recognition of
its kind. Indeed, it has been said that over the last few decades, both the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have
consistently demonstrated a desire to narrow the scope of existing privileges, as well as a noticeable hesitancy to embrace
the existence of new ones. 6 For the most part, however, the
privilege of self-critical analysis has survived the slings and
arrows that have slain its brethren.
One could argue that the equivocation with which the
privilege is met may only exist because neither the Supreme
Court, nor any circuit court, 7 has squarely considered its propriety. 8 Indeed, this is the position taken by many lower
courts, who, left to postulate as to the privilege's existence in a
climate inhospitable to its kind, decline to recognize the privilege. 9 Many of these courts have also extrapolated from in-

"' Pkfinans Int'l Corp. v. IBJ Schroder Leasing Corp., No. 93-5375, 1996 WL
675772, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 1996). The distinction between what is factual
and what is evaluative is not always one that is easily made. For a discussion of
this point, see Note, The Self-Critical Analysis Privilege and Discovery of Affirmative Action Plans in Title VII Suits, 83 MICH. L. REv. 405, 417-18 (1984).
11 See Bredice v. Doctors Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970).
1 See Solarex Corp. v. Arco Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 168 n.3 (E.D.N.Y.
1988) (citing United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984); Trammel
v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980); United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360
(1980); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, (1972); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
Dated Jan. 4, 1984, 750 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoena
(Marc Rich), 731 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Lawrence
Matthews), 714 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Doe, 711 F.2d 1187 (2d Cir. 1983);
In re Cueto, 554 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1977); Kaufman v. Edelstein, 539 F.2d 811 (2d
Cir. 1976)). But see Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1 (1996) (recognizing the existence of the psychotherapist-patient privilege).
17 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed a district court's application of the privilege in the following manner: "[W]e hold that no privilege of
'self-critical analysis' protects routine internal corporate reviews of matters related
to safety concerns. Even if such a privilege exists, the justifications for it do not
support its application to voluntary routine safety reviews." Dowling, 971 F.2d at
426 (emphasis added).
" See id. at 425 n.1; Abel v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 91-6261, 1993 WL
33348, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993).
" See, e.g., Abbott v. Harris Publications, No. 97-7648, 1999 WL 549002
(S.D.N.Y. July 28, 1999) ("In light of the Supreme Court opinion in [EEOC], it is
clear that to the extent a self-critical analysis privilege has any continued validity,
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structions provided by cases in which analogous judiciallycrafted privileges are recognized based on the principle of
maintaining a free flow of candid information.
II. THE TRIALS OF THEORY
As articulated above, several courts have stated that the
rationale behind the self-evaluative privilege has indeed been
addressed, and rejected, by the Supreme Court.21 These suppositions have, of course, acted as a hurdle to the privilege's
application. Indeed, the question of whether the Court has
addressed the theoretical basis supporting the recognition of
the privilege has provided the impetus (and necessity) for talmudic analyses concerning the viability of the privilege whenever it is asserted.
Yet a review of the Court's decisions which are cited to in
this respect illustrates that they may not be as fatal to the
cause as some have thought. That is, neither United States v.
Arthur Young & Co. nor University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC,
the two cases that are most often cited to in support of the
proposition that the privilege would not withstand the Court's

the party seeking to invoke it bears a heavy burden of establishing that public
policy strongly favors the type of review at issue and that disclosure in the course
of discovery will have a substantial chilling effect on the willingness of parties to
engage in such reviews."); Wimer v. Sealand Serv., Inc., No. 96-8730, 1997 WL
375661, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1997) ("[The privilege's] viability has been called
into question by the analysis of the Supreme Court in [EEOC]."); Troupin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (the "Supreme Court
[in EEOC] cast some doubt on the vitality of the Privilege by declining to recognize a qualified common-law privilege against the disclosure of confidential peer
review materials, a privilege based largely on the same policy considerations as
the self-critical analysis privilege"); Cobb v. Rockefeller Univ., No. 90 Civ. 6515,
1991 WL 222125, *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1991) (noting the Supreme Court's decision
in University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990), upon consideration of
the applicability of the self-evaluative privilege); Lamitie v. Emerson Elec. Co., 142
A.D.2d 293, 298, 535 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653 (3d Dep't 1988) ("The United States Supreme Court, in United States v. Arthur Young & Co., rejected policy arguments
similar to those underlying the critical self-analysis privilege in holding that no
privilege applied to work papers of independent auditors used in preparation of
financial reports of publicly held corporations required under Federal securities
laws.").
20 See supra note 19.
21 See id.
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A. United States v. Arthur Young & Co.'
Arthur Young & Co. ("Arthur Young"), a firm of certified
public accountants, was hired by the Amerada Hess Corporation ("Amerada") to review financial statements prepared to
satisfy federal securities law disclosure requirements.2 4 As
part of its obligation, Arthur Young was charged with reviewing Amerada's tax liabilities, as well as Amerada's reserve
capacity to meet themY The records produced as a result of
this analysis were identified as "tax accrual workpapers."2 6
A subsequent "routine audit" by the Internal Revenue
Service ("IRS") revealed "questionable payments from a 'special
disbursement account" and resulted in a criminal investigation
of Amerada. 7 Pursuant to the powers provided by § 7602 of
the Internal Revenue Code, the IRS subpoenaed all of Arthur
Young's files relating to its corporate client, including the tax
accrual workpapers. s
In accordance with Amerada's instruction, Arthur Young
did not respond to the subpoena,2 9 and the IRS then filed an
action for compliance in the Southern District of New York.3 °
Upon the district court's determination that the records must
be produced, Arthur Young appealed to the Second Circuit.3
Arthur Young argued that because the tax accrual
workpapers contained "projections, opinions, and hypotheses of
possible tax consequences based on factual data derived from

22 See id.
23 United

States v. Arthur Young & Co., 677

F.2d 211

(2d Cir. 1982)

[hereinafter Arthur Young II], affd in part, rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
24 See id. at 214.
See id.
26

Id. at 215.

27 United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805, 805 (1984) [hereinafter

Arthur Young III].
28 See id.
29 See id.
20 See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 496 F. Supp. 1152 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) [hereinafter Arthur Young 1], rev'd, 677 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1982), affd in
part, rev'd in part, 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
21 See Arthur Young II, 677 F.2d at 211.
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the client's records,"32 to require their production would "undermine the ability of the client to deal candidly with its auditor[s]."" The firm also argued that a type of "auditor-client"

privilege protected the documents, as the client would have an
expectation of privacy with respect to such communications.34
The court of appeals identified the conflict in the case
before it as one "between 'the legitimate interests of society in
enforcement of its laws and collection of the revenues' and the
'national public interest [in] insur[ing] the maintenance of fair
and honest markets in [securities] transactions."'35 The court
also stated the following:
Divulging [the] information [contained in the tax accrual
workpapers] necessarily puts the taxpayer-corporation at a substan-

tial disadvantage when it is audited. The prejudice involved in exposing to the [IRS] appraisals of the taxpayer's weaknesses and
settlement positions [which are revealed in the tax accrual
workpapers] on audit is of such proportions that a prudent organization might not be perfectly candid with independent auditors once it
knew that the information revealed would be reachable under
§ 7602.36

Thus, in order to "protect the investing public from inaccurate
financial information,"3 7 the court found that "[a] work-product privilege, similar to the privilege fashioned in Hickman,
seems... appropriate."" Upon concluding that the IRS failed
to make a sufficient showing of need to override the applicable
qualified privilege, the court determined that the tax accrual
workpapers need not be produced.39
The Supreme Court reversed this determination,4" stating
that "[wihile § 7602 is 'subject to the traditional privileges and
limitations,' any other restrictions upon the IRS summons
power should be avoided 'absent unambiguous directions from

32
33

Arthur Young I, 496 F. Supp. at 1155.
Id. at 1156.

3, Id.

Arthur Young II, 677 F.2d at 219 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
Id. at 220.
Id.
38 Id. at 221 (citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (establishing
qualified work-product privilege)).
's

36
37

3" Id.
" See

Arthur Young III, 465 U.S. 805 (1984).
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Congress." 4 Because Congress made no such unambiguous
directive, the Court declined to foster a sort of "judicially created work-product immunity for tax accrual workpapers" that
were summoned pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code.4 2
The Court went on to note that "the very language of
§ 7602 reflects... a congressional policy choice in favor of
disclosure of all information relevant to a legitimate IRS inquiry" and that "[iun light of this explicit statement by the Legislative Branch, courts should be chary in recognizing exceptions to the broad summons authority of the IRS or in fashioning new privileges that would curtail disclosure under
[the statute]. '
Clearly, then, the Court's initial analysis in Arthur Young
was heavily influenced by the broad authority provided to the
IRS pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code.44 The Court's
conclusion that, since the legislature designed the reach and
scope of § 7602, it should be the legislature that imposes any
limit on the same, is one that obviously militates against the
recognition of any judicially-created privilege hindering a
statute's breadth.
Yet this aspect of the Court's decision provides little instruction with respect to whether a lower court may recognize
the self-evaluative privilege. This is simply because few, if any,
of the factual contexts in which the privilege is addressed provide an analogue to § 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code. That
is, there is rarely a set of records over which the privilege is
asserted that falls within the province of a federal statute that
mandates disclosure. Even if there were such an analogue,
however, it is logical to assume it would take precedence over
the application of the privilege. Indeed, where there exists a
law requiring the production of certain documents, the determination with respect to competing interests has already been
made, with the interests in disclosure superceding any interests that may be furthered by protection.

"' Id. at 816 (citations omitted).
42

Id.

'

Id. at 816-17.

Id.
Lower courts seem to have adopted a hybrid of this principle upon considering whether the application of the privilege may withstand a request for documents from a government agency. See Federal Trade Comm'n v. TRW, Inc., 628
44

"

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65: 2

More relevant to our purposes, however, is the manner in
which the Court addressed the Second Circuit's conclusions
with respect to the danger of impeding candid communications
between auditor and client upon disclosure of the tax accrual
workpapers. In light of the impact that the Court's treatment
of this issue has on the instant analysis, its full reproduction
is warranted:
To the extent that the Court of Appeals, in its concern for the "chilling effect" of the disclosure of tax accrual workpapers, sought to
facilitate communication between independent auditors and their
clients, its remedy more closely resembles a testimonial accountantclient privilege than a work-product immunity for accountants'
workpapers. But as this Court stated in Couch v. United States, 409
U.S. 322, 335 (1973), "no confidential accountant-client privilege
exists under federal law, and no state-created privilege has been
recognized in federal cases." In light of Couch, the Court of Appeals'
effort to foster candid communication between accountant and client
by creating a self-styled work-product privilege was misplaced, and
conflicts with what we see as the clear intent of Congress.46
We cannot accept the view that the integrity of the securities
markets will suffer absent some protection for accountants' tax accrual workpapers. The Court of Appeals apparently feared that,
were the IRS to have access to tax accrual workpapers, a corporation might be tempted to withhold from its auditor certain information relevant and material to a proper evaluation of its financial
statements. But the independent certified public accountant cannot
be content with the corporation's representations that its tax accrual
reserves are adequate; the auditor is ethically and professionally
obligated to ascertain for himself as far as possible whether the
corporation's contingent tax liabilities have been accurately stated.
If the auditor were convinced that the scope of the examination had
been limited by management's reluctance to disclose matters relating to the tax accrual reserves, the auditor would be unable to issue
an unqualified opinion as to the accuracy of the corporation's financial statements. Instead, the auditor would be required to issue a
qualified opinion, an adverse opinion, or a disclaimer of opinion,
thereby notifying the investing public of possible potential problems
inherent in the corporation's financial reports. Responsible corporate

F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir. 1980) ("Whatever may be the status of the 'self-evaluative'
privilege in the context of private litigation, courts with apparent uniformity have
refused its application where . .. the documents in question have been sought by
a governmental agency.") (citations omitted).
" Arthur Young III, 465 U.S. at 817.
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management would not risk a qualified evaluation of a corporate
taxpayer's financial posture to afford cover for questionable positions

reflected in a prior tax return. Thus, the independent auditor's obligation to serve the public interest assures that the integrity of the
securities markets will be preserved, without the need for47 a workproduct immunity for accountants' tax accrual workpapers.

The Court thus rejected the Second Circuit's contention that a
modified privilege protecting the tax accrual workpapers from
disclosure would be necessary to ensure forthright communications between auditor and client.
Because an analogous "chilling effect" argument is submitted by proponents of the self-evaluative privilege, it may appear that the Court's determination in Arthur Young sheds
doubt upon the privilege's viability.4 8 Yet, when one looks beyond the surface appeal of this conclusion, distinctions between
the factual contexts in which the self-evaluative privilege
thrives and that which existed in Arthur Young are revealed.
Moreover, one can see how the Arthur Young analysis actually
compliments the theoretical basis for the privilege, rather than
detracts from it.
First, it should be noted that the Arthur Young Court's
"invisible hand" argument, which suggests that disclosure will
not dissuade a corporate entity from engaging in self-critical
analyses because such evaluations are necessary precursors for
successful competition in the marketplace, may only be made
within the confined context of the corporate or investigatory
reports. That is, one would be hard-pressed to argue that independent marketplace incentives or an invisible hand exists so
to propel self-analysis within the context of the equal employment opportunity studies or affirmative action plans. As such,
the Court's rationale in Arthur Young is not readily applicable
Id. at 818-19 (citations omitted).
sAt least one commentator has propounded a similar argument with respect
to the self-evaluative privilege:
Because a corporation functions in a competitive commercial environment,
it must constantly evaluate its organization and personnel in order to
survive. Failure to critically review its performance inevitably leads to
misperceptions about the market, and within a short time, penalties from
the marketplace. This pressure to conduct critical appraisals is not only
imposed by the milieu in which the corporation operates, but also emanates from within the organization, which creates incentives for employees to review its operations.
Flanagan, supra note 2, at 561.
'7
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to a healthy segment of the cases in which the self-evaluative
privilege is recognized,4 9 and in this sense, the "invisible
hand" is limited in its reach.
Yet, what of this independent incentive rationale outside
of the context of equal employment cases? That is, may the
privilege be recognized within the context of corporate or investigatory self-analyses in light of the Court's determination in
Arthur Young? The answer to this query appears to be yes,
simply because there remains room for its existence within the
Arthur Young paradigm.
As articulated in the preceding section," the defined selfevaluative privilege actually invites the type of analysis undertaken in Arthur Young, albeit on a case-by-case basis. That is,
prior to determining the privilege's applicability, a court must
ascertain whether the information at issue is "of the type
whose flow would be curtailed if discovery were allowed." 1
This essentially requires a court, as a threshold inquiry, to
ascertain whether the "independent incentives" cited to by the
Court counter any chilling effect that the threat of disclosure
may beget. Upon a court's determination that said incentive
exists, the privilege would not apply.
Put another way, the analysis required upon the application of the privilege incorporates the "independent incentive"
principle enunciated in Arthur Young. This point undermines
the conclusion that Arthur Young compels a finding that the
theoretical basis supporting the self-evaluative privilege is

" See, e.g., Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc., No. 98-2205, 1999 WL 511673
(S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1999) (applied); Troupin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169
F.R.D. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (applied); Sheppard v. Consolidated Edison Co., 893 F.
Supp. 6 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (applied); Reilly v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., No. 937317, 1995 WL 105286 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 13, 1995) (recognized, not applied); Abel v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 91-6261, 1993 WL 33348 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 1993) (does
not recognize); Flynn v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 91-0035, 1993 WL 362380
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993) (applied); Cobb v. Rockefeller Univ., No. 90-6516, 1991
WL 222125 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1991); Hardy v. New York News Inc., 114 F.R.D.
633 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (recognized, not applied); Boyd v. City of New York, No. 864501-CSH, 1987 WL 6915 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 1987); Mazzella v. RCA Global Communications., Inc., No. 83 Civ. 3716, 1984 VL 55541 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1984);
Zahorik v. Cornell Univ., 98 F.R.D. 27 (N.D.N.Y. 1983) (recognized, not applied).

o See supra Part I.

Spencer v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., No. 98-2817, 1999 WL 619637, at *2
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 1999).
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infirm. To the contrary, the viability of the privilege's foundation is strengthened upon the determination that its application harnesses the key component of the Arthur
Young analysis.
District courts that have recognized the privilege apply the
"independent incentive" aspect of the privilege's analysis
thoughtfully. For example, in Spencer v. Sea-Land Service,
Inc.,52 the district court confronted the issue of whether the
privilege was applicable to a redacted portion of an "Incident
Investigation Report" which was created by a crew member of
the ship upon which plaintiff was injured.5 3
The court began its analysis with the language of suspicion that has become almost a prerequisite to any discussion of
the privilege, irrespective of its recognition. It noted that "some
courts have suggested the availability... of the so-called selfcritical analysis privilege to block discovery of information
pertaining to a party's evaluation of its own performance...
[while] [o]ther courts have been skeptical about the viability of
the principle, and many courts have rejected it altogether.""
It then found that even "assum[ing] the potential availability
of such a privilege," the defendant had not justified its application.55 In an argument reminiscent of the Supreme Court's
position in Arthur Young, the court explained that it did "not
believe that disclosure would impede accurate and truthful
reporting by defendant of accident analyses in the future.""
This was because "[a] company in the business of supplying or
operating ocean-going vessels has significant incentives to
assess and correct malfunctions in its equipment and to under7
take corrective measures to avoid future accidents."5
52

Id.

'3

Id. at *1.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at *2.
Spencer, 1999 WL 619637, at *3.
5 Id. (citing Dowling v. American Hawaii Cruises, Inc., 971 F.2d 423, 426 (9th
Cir. 1992) (rejecting application of self-critical analysis privilege to routine safety
reviews, noting that "joirganizations have many incentives to conduct such reviews
that outweigh the harm that might result from disclosure"); In re Salomon Inc.
Sec. Litig., No. 91-5442, 1992 WL 350762, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 1992) (observing that "economic efficiencies, the accuracy of financial reporting and the improvement of business standards achieved by internal auditing programs and management control studies are so integral to the success of a business that the free flow
of information is not likely to be stemmed by the possibility of future disclosure")
"
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Thus, despite the hedging language in which the review of
the privilege is placed, Spencer provides an example of the
theoretical harmony which may be reached between the principles of Arthur Young and the privilege's application. Specifically, the court's analysis identifies and applies the Arthur
Young's directive in a manner that is not inconsistent with
its philosophy.
B. University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC
Another Supreme Court case to which courts cite" when
postulating the viability, or the lack thereof, of the privilege is
University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC ("EEOC").5 9 In EEOC,
Rosalie Tung ("Tung") asserted that she had been sexually
harassed by a department chairperson at the University of
Pennsylvania ("University"), and that upon her insistence that
their relationship remain professional, she was denied tenure.6" Tung also stated her qualifications for tenure were either equal or better than that of her five male colleagues who
had received more favorable treatment.6 ' Tung filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC" or "Commission") pursuant to Title VII.6 '
The EEOC undertook an investigation and eventually
subpoenaed both Tung's tenure review files and those of her
five male colleagues.6 3 The University requested that the
Court deem the peer review documents privileged to "protect
the integrity of the peer review process, which in turn is
central to the proper functioning of many colleges and
universities."'
In denying to so protect the sought documents, the Court
stated that it "do[es] not create and apply an evidentary privilege unless it 'promotes sufficiently important interests to

(further citation omitted).
" See supra note 19.

'9 493 U.S. 182 (1990)
60 See id. at 185.
61 See id.
62 See

id.

See id. at 186.
64 EEOC, 493 U.S. at 189.
"
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outweigh the need for probative evidence,'" and "[w]ith... this
in mind, [it] [could] not accept the University's invitation to
create a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review

materials."65 The Court also noted that "Congress, in extending Title VII to educational institutions and in providing for

broad EEOC subpoena powers, did not see fit to create a privi-

lege to peer review documents."66 Indeed, the "plain language
of the text of § 2000e-8(a), [mandates] that the Commission
67
'shall ... have access' to 'relevant' evidence.
Particularly relevant to our review is the Court's evalua-

tion of the University's argument that protecting the documents is in the public interest:
We readily agree with petitioner that universities and colleges play
significant roles in American society. Nor need we question, at this
point, petitioner's assertion that confidentiality is important to the
proper functioning of the peer review process under which many
academic institutions operate. The costs that ensue from disclosure,
however, constitute only one side of the balance. As Congress has
recognized, the costs associated with racial and sexual discrimination in institutions of higher learning are very substantial. Few
would deny that ferreting out this kind of invidious discrimination is
a great, if not compelling, government interest. Often, as even petitioner seems to admit, disclosure of peer review materials will be
necessary in order for the Commission to determine whether illegal
discrimination has taken place. Indeed, if there is a "smoking gun"
tenure decisions, it
to be found that demonstrates discrimination in
6
is likely to be tucked away in peer review files. "

Id. (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980)).
Id. The Court expounded on this point, noting:
When Title VII was enacted originally in 1964, it exempted an "educational institution with respect to the employment of individuals to perform work connected with the educational activities of such institution."
Eight years later, Congress eliminated that specific exemption by enacting § 3 of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972. This extension of Title VII was Congress' considered response to the widespread
and compelling problem of invidious discrimination in educational institutions.
Id. at 189-90 (citations omitted).
' Id. at 192. The Court went on to note that Congress "did address situations
in which an employer may have an interest in the confidentiality of its records,"
and provided for a modicum of protection in this respect. EEOC, 493 U.S. at 192.
This point harms the University's argument, the Court opined, because the
University's application essentially requests that the Court provide more protection
than that deemed appropriate by Congress. See id. at 192-93.
"' Id. at 193.
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As in Arthur Young, it is clear that in EEOC, the crux of
the Court's decision to deny protection of the documents sought
is that there exists a relatively clear (and broad) statutory
directive that the documents be produced. As the Court stated:
"[Tihe EEOC may obtain 'relevant' evidence. Congress has
made the choice." 9 And again, one strains to think of an instance where the self-evaluative privilege has gone toe to toe
against a similar legislative mandate. 0 In this sense, EEOC
fails to provide a paradigm under which one may evaluate
application of the self-evaluative privilege where there is an
absence of a statutory edict.
A similar factual distinction, and perhaps one that is more
important, is that the documents sought in EEOC did not
contain a self-evaluation. 7 To the contrary, the Commission
sought employee analyses which were routinely generated in
the University's ordinary course of business. This context is
clearly distinguishable from the instance where an internal
analysis is undertaken with respect to a particular issue, such
as where a corporation "in good faith, seeks to improve its
employment practices and to comply with pertinent [employment] laws" 2 through self-evaluation. Accordingly, reliance on
EEOC for the proposition that its analysis precludes recognition of the privilege is misplaced.
Even beyond these factual distinctions, it is also important
to note that in EEOC, the University's interest in confidentiality was found to be in conflict with society's interest in "ferreting out.., invidious discrimination."7 3 The Court's determination that, on balance, the former was subordinate to the
latter served to cement the conclusion that no privilege existed
to protect the sought documents from disclosure. Yet interestingly, it is this same societal interest in the eradication of
discriminatory employment practices 4 that is said to be per" Id.
at 194.
7o This is in contrast to the relatively common scenario where the applicability
of the self-evaluative privilege is pondered in relation to an evaluation or analysis

that was itself statutorily compelled.

71 See id. at 186.
72 Trezza v. The Hartford, Inc., No. 98-2205, 1999 WL 511673, at *2 (S.D.N.Y.

July 20, 1999).
"
EEOC, 493 U.S. at 193.
" One court has commented that "in the area of employment
discrimination
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petuated, rather than impeded, by application of the privilege.
An illustration of this last point is provided by Flynn v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co.75 There, the court found that documents generated by an organization voluntarily hired by defendant to "stud[y] the barriers to ... equal ... employment" so
76
to "identify and eliminate" the same were protected. The
court was "persuaded by [the organization's] argument that if
such reports [were] discoverable absent a showing of compelling need, employers would be highly reluctant" to undertake
7
Because "[t]he goal of eliminating [dissuch evaluations?.
criminatory] barriers... is well served by encouraging such
self-critical assessments," this goal "should not be undermined
absent a compelling showing of need, [to] be determined in
light of the plaintiff's claims."7 1 The court then applied the
self-evaluative privilege to protect the documents generated
pursuant to the review.7 9
Goldman provides an example of how the privilege's protection may be utilized to foster the very policy interest which
provided the basis for compelling production in EEOC. That is,
protecting self-evaluative documents from disclosure may legitimately function as a mechanism by which an entity may pursue the goal of purging discriminatory employment practices.
In light of this point, EEOC should not be broadly identified as
a justification from which one may easily conclude that the
privilege is defunct.

virtually every court [that has recognized the privilege] has limited [it] to information or reports that are mandated by statute or regulation," Hardy v. New York
News Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 641 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), the theory being that it would be
unfair to require an entity to undertake such an analysis, and then compel said
entity to provide the qame to their adversary. That is, where such an analysis is
voluntarily undertaken '[no unfairness exists" upon mandating production, as "no
third party required [the entity] to make a critical self-evaluation, or indeed, any
evaluation at all." Id.
' No. 91-0035, 1993 WL 362380 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1993).
76 Id. at *1.
Id. at *2.
78 Id.
79 See id. at *3.
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CONCLUSION

The distinctions of fact which exist between Arthur Young,
EEOC, and the prototypical facts of self-evaluative privilege
cases are abundant. Similarly, the theoretical maxims delineated in these "privilege precedent" cases are not necessarily
incongruent with the those which provide the basis for the
privilege. These points, taken in conjunction with one another,
lead to the conclusion that the ground upon which the privilege
stands is not as unsteady as one might think.' This conclusion is proffered in the hope that it will assist courts confronted with such an analysis.

80 It appears that some courts have reached this same determination, as, despite protestations to the contrary, the privilege continues to develop within this
circuit. See Troupin v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 169 F.R.D. 546, 548 (S.D.N.Y.
1996). It is also interesting to note that "[a] trendy surge regarding the privilege
of self-critical analysis has blossomed at the state level, with several states statutorily enacting laws shielding internal self-critical analysis from discovery." Brad
Bacon, The Privilege of Self-Critical Analysis: Encouraging Recognition of the Misunderstood Privilege, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLy 221, 226 (1999).

